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u usa 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH WEEKS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CEROLA DANSIE CALDERWOOD, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
vs. 
CONSTANCE E. PATTON ZARBOCK, 
Third-Party Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 15,671 
BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The third-party defendant accepts and incorporates 
into her brief the Statement of the Nature of the Case and the 
Disposition in the Lower Court as set forth in plaintiff's brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The third-party defendant seeks to have the judgment 
of the trial court affirmed. 
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STATEHENT OF FACTS 
The third-party defendant accepts and incorporates 
into her brief the Statement of Facts as set forth in plain-
tiff's brief with the addition that the expert medical testi· 
mony presented at trial was conflicting as to the nature and 
extent of plaintiff's injuries. 
ARGUM:ENT 
POI~T I. BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND THAT THE THIRD-PARTY DEFEN-
DANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, ANY ERROR AS TO ASSESSHENT 
OF DAMAGES IS NOT A GROUND FOR REVERSING THE JUDG-
HENT IN FAVOR OF THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT. 
The arguments by both plaintiff and defendant in 
their respective briefs on appeal deal almost exclusively wit 
the issue of damages. (Plaintiff's brief at Table of Content 
and Defendant's brief at Table of Contents). The one excep-
tion is plaintiff's Point V which will be dealt with below. 
All of the parties to this action now a~parently agree that 
the third-party defendant was not liable for the accident anc 
plaintiff's resulting injuries. 
The Statement of Facts in the briefs of both the 
plaintiff and the defendant admit that the automobile driven 
by the third-party defendant was "impelled into the cal 
in which appellant was a passenger" by an impact from the de· 
fendant's automobile. (Plaintiff's brief at 2, Defendant's 
brief at 2). 
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In addition to the fact that the focus of the briefs 
of both plaintiff and defendant is on the issue of damages, of 
significance in this appeal is that by unanimous verdict the 
jury at trial found the third-party defendant zero percent 
negligent. (Tr. at 228, 696-697). 
Thus, since the jury found that the third-party 
defendant was not negligent, whatever the alleged error of 
the trial court in submitting the damage issue to the jury or 
of the jury in assessing damages, that error, if any, did not 
prejudice the plaintiff's rights against the third-party de-
fendant. 
POINT II. THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL JUDGE TO THE 
JURY, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, CORRECTLY STATE THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
The general rule in Utah is that instructions are 
to be judged as a whole, each in light of the others, and if 
they correctly state the law when read together, they are 
proper. Brunson v. Strong, 412 P.2d 451, 17 U.2d 364 (1966), 
Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 263 P.2d 287, 1 U.2d 143 
(1953). 
Plaintiff claims the instructions given by the 
court at trial place undue emphasis on the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof and cites instructions 11, 12, 13, 18 and 19 in 
support of her claim. 
The very first example given by plaintiff under-
-3-
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cuts her claim. Instruction ~o. 11 sets forth the require-
ment that a party making a claim or defense has the burden ol 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. This instruction 
has equal applicability to the burdens of the plaintiff, the 
defendant and the third-party defendant. This instruction wa 
submitted by the plaintiff herself. (Tr. at 209). 
Contrary to the statement in plaintiff's brief at 
18, instruction No. 18 is applicable to all of the parties. 
It does not place special emphasis on the plaintiff's burden. 
Since, by instruction No. 2, the court clearly ad· 
vised the jury that the defendant and third-party defendant 
were each claiming that the other's negligence caused the 
plaintiff's injury, the court's general instructions as to 
the burden of proof obviously conveyed to the jury the carr~ 
impression that any party, whether plaintiff, defendant or 
third-party defendant, who claimed that another party was 
negligent had the burden of proof as to that claim. 
Surprisingly enough, while plaintiff claims that 
references in the five cited instructions overemphasized her 
burden of proof, she herself submitted three instructions ex 
plaining and referring to the concept of preponderance of 
the evidence. (Tr. 207, 208 and 209). 
POINT III. INFORJv!AL STATEMENTS OF nvo JURORS OUT OF THE 
HEARING OF THE OTHER JURORS AND NOT DURING DE-
LIBERATIONS DO NOT V!PEACH THE JURY VERDICT. 
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r. #CS a 
In Utah, the presumption is that jurors have con-
ducted themselves properly and the presumption is rebuttable 
only by definite proof of prejudicial misconduct. Arellano 
v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 298 P.2d 527, 5 U.2d 146 
(1956). Plaintiff's claimed "definite proof" consists of 
statements by two jurors in the men's room during a recess in 
the trial speculating whether the defendants had insurance. 
These casual statements by two jurors in an infor-
mal setting out of the hearing of the other jurors do not 
rise to the level of definite proof of misconduct that war-
rant the impeachment of the unanimous jury verdict. 
Plaintiff attempts to support her claim of jury 
misconduct by reference to an article at 47 A.L.R. 3d 1299. 
However, that article is limited to the subject of references 
by jurors to insurance during the jury's deliberations. 47 
A.L.R. 3d at 1302. ll'here a juror's mention of insurance is 
only casual, there is no misconduct. 47 A.L.R. 3d at 1303. 
CONCLUSION 
The third-party defendant respectfully submits that 
plaintiff's appeal is without merit and, in particular, the 
judgment of the trial court based on a unanimous verdict that 
the third-party defendant was not negligent should be upheld. 
DATED this 2,;3 day of June, 1978. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & 
s for Third- arty De 
fendant- Respondent 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Third-Party 
dent, postage prepaid, on this <23 tZJ:J day of June, 
Stephen G. Horgan, 345 South State Street, Salt Lake 
84111, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent and to Craig M. 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen, 120 East 300 North, 
84601, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
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